May 2002
Special Report
Building "Synergistic" AV
Signature scanners aren't enough to combat today's multivector
viruses and worms.
BY Peter Tippett
Many IT security managers have a difficult time coming to terms
with the fact that their primary security controls are fallible.
"Primary" controls, in this context, refer to security mechanisms or
technologies that mitigate a particular threat most of the time-in
fact, more than 90 percent of the time--but never all of the
time.
Antivirus scanners are a good example of the fallibility of
primary controls. AV scanners stop in excess of 90 percent of
malicious code threats. But despite the huge day-in, day-out success
of AV products, failures still happen--often in spectacular fashion.
According to the Seventh Annual ICSA Labs' Virus Prevalence
Survey (www.trusecure.com/html/news/press/2002/pravsurvey030402.shtml),
every year organizations spend more and more money attempting to
mitigate the risk of viruses and worms. Yet each year the impact of
viruses--measured as frequency or cost of virus encounters,
incidents and disasters--continues to worsen (see "How Bad Is
It?").
There are two main reasons why our defenses continue to lag
behind the virus and worm problem: (1) the problem is evolving
faster than our defenses are; and (2) we typically think in narrow
terms about how to mitigate the threat. In addition to using AV
scanners as a primary control, we need to build a more
robust
defense-in-depth architecture utilizing practical "synergistic"
controls.
Zero Hour
The rapid evolution in virus infection vectors--from boot-sector
to file-type to macro to mail-enabled to network-enabled--points to
the possibility that we'll experience a "zero hour" virus relatively
soon. When the Form boot-sector virus was released in 1989, it took
nearly a year to become pervasive. The Concept Macro virus, first
seen in 1995, took about three months to fully make the rounds.
LoveLetter took only about one day, while Code Red needed roughly 90
minutes. Nimda took less than 30 minutes. The trend behind these
numbers is clear: With each new step in the evolution of malicious
code, viruses and worms get closer and closer to spreading
everywhere as soon as they're released.
Fewer and fewer new viruses rely on social engineering to
succeed. In the old days, malcode never directly exploited a
vulnerability in an operating system or application, but rather
cajoled users into executing a viral program that then replicated
itself. Over the past year, however, malcode has begun to leverage
OS or application vulnerabilities with or without additional social
exploits. The most successful malcode exploits both technical and
human fallibilities.
Furthermore, the desktop is no longer the only replication
engine. While client machines are still a significant infection
vector, Web, application and other servers are increasingly the
primary target, as exemplified by L10n, PoisonBOx, Code Red and
Nimda. With the dawn of "the age of the worm," exploit code spreads
itself and no longer needs to hitchhike on other code.
Primary Controls
Used as a primary control, scanner-based AV products are
increasingly powerless against the zero hour threat. And, of course,
desktop- or e-mail-based antivirus does almost nothing to address
the server-as-worm-vector problem.
To address these problems, we need to go beyond AV scanning as
the sole protection for our organizations. AV scanning is still a
necessary primary control, but we need to layer in several
"secondary" or "synergistic" security controls for a more robust
defense posture. Synergistic controls are relatively simple,
easy-to-manage technologies and practices that supplement our
primary controls. Individually, synergistic controls are nowhere
near as good as primary controls. But when used together, they
protect our organizations and data when (not if) primary controls
fail.
Before we implement synergistic controls, however, we must first
ensure that our primary controls are in place and functional. Given
the evolution of attack vectors, this means examining controls at
both the desktop and server levels.
For desktop-vector viruses, three primary controls are
recommended: (1) desktop AV scanning, (2) mail gateway AV scanning,
and (3) mail gateway file filtering. Currently, almost all companies
use AV at the desktop, according to ICSA Labs' Virus Prevalence
Survey. However, only about three-quarters of organizations use AV
at the mail gateway, and only about half do gateway file
filtering.
Desktop AV. For maximum effectiveness, desktop
antivirus must be (a) set up to operate full time and in the
background on all file reads, writes and executes; (b) configured to
scan all file types; and (c) updated at least monthly.
A common misconception about desktop scanning is that the hard
disk must be scanned on a daily or weekly basis. In reality, any
periodic scanning adds no incremental value to desktop virus
protection. If the full-time background protection is functioning,
then all files read, written or executed from the drive will be
scanned anyway. Scanning again on a weekly schedule adds little or
no value.
Also, since viruses and worms utilize (or spoof) a wide array of
file types--some of which are not actually program files--all file
types must be included in real-time scans. Since most AV scanning
products don't scan all files by default, configuration settings
usually need to be altered.
Some vendors recommend updating desktop AV definitions not
monthly, but on a weekly or daily basis. Practically speaking, doing
so results in a slight increase in desktop protection, but such a
gain must be balanced against the additional time, effort and cost
that's required. Synergy really helps here, because most synergistic
controls are aimed at the zero hour problem, and therefore will also
effectively address the "zero week" problem.
AV at the mail gateway. Antivirus at the mail
gateway must be (1) configured to scan all file types, (2)
architected to never "fail open" when overwhelmed by a huge volume
of infected messages, and (3) updated at least weekly.
Most gateway AV products had big problems with overload a couple
of years ago. If the gateway received hundreds or thousands of
infected messages, the AV function would become saturated, allowing
some infected messages to slip through. Though they have
significantly improved, virtually all AV products can still be
overloaded. AV vendors may outline specific recommendations to
reduce this risk; the best strategy usually involves running AV on a
separate box rather than directly on the mail server.
File filtering, mail gateway. File filtering at
the mail gateway is an absolutely essential control at the
enterprise level. Gateway filtering can be accomplished in several
different ways. Some server AV solutions come with a file filtering
option. Alternatively, you can configure the mail server itself to
filter for certain file types. You can add a separate box with
Sendmail, Postscript or similar SMTP function with filtering. Or,
you can utilize third-party content management software.
The best configuration for file filtering is "default deny," in
which all file types are stripped out except those specifically
needed in your business environment. Implementing a rule such as
"deny all attachments except *.doc, *.rtf, *.xls, *.ppt, *.txt,
*.pdf, *.zip" is more effective than using a "default allow"
configuration and specifying a list of file types to deny. However,
very few products are capable of implementing a default deny rule,
and must rely on a list of blocked file types.1
Interestingly, mail gateway scanning and file filtering weren't
primary controls three years ago. But as viruses and worms
increasingly infect the enterprise via mail-borne vectors,
attachment filtering is now an essential practice. In the next year
or two, scanning/filtering at the gateway is likely to become more
of a secondary control as malcode increasingly migrates away from
the mail vector and toward the network vector.
Primary Controls for Host-Vector Malcode
For the rapidly growing problem of malcode that utilizes Web and
other servers as a primary replication vector, there's only one real
primary control: Assuring that servers are resistant to all easily
exploited vulnerabilities. This can be accomplished either via
frequent vulnerability tests and patching, or by hardening servers
against known attack vectors. An appropriate hardening strategy can
be significantly less expensive and easier to maintain than a
patching/vulnerability testing strategy, but both strategies are
primary mechanisms to prevent malcode.
For next-generation viruses and worms, the only primary controls
will be those that mitigate certain vulnerabilities in network-aware
components (like browsers) and helper components (like multimedia
players). Unfortunately, this means either frequent
patching/vulnerability testing cycles at the desktop level--for most
shops a horrific and expensive job--or some level of hardening at
the desktop coupled with a much less aggressive patching regimen.
Synergistic Controls
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of secondary (or synergistic) controls
exist for malcode at the enterprise level (see "Synergistic AV
Controls"). Each is between 60 and 90 percent effective for some
category of malcode, and therefore is defined as a synergistic
control. These can range from the complex and expensive (desktop
firewalls and content management products) to the specific and
trivial (setting certain registry keys and adjusting application and
operating system configurations). Such controls should not only
cover computer and software issues, but also address network and
human factors.
It's important to note that synergistic controls don't
necessarily protect data and resources. Some synergistic controls
are geared toward detecting an attack, while others are better
suited to help the enterprise recover from a virus incident.
Combining robust primary controls with easily applied and
inexpensive synergistic controls will dramatically decrease the
likelihood that your organization will suffer a virus or worm
disaster. The redundancy of controls creates a defense-in-depth
architecture in which the fallibility of any one control doesn't
significantly undermine the enterprise's overall security
posture.2
The idea of using control synergy isn't to use all potential
controls, or to pick the "strongest" controls, but to use the
synergistic security thought process to create a set of controls
that supplement your primary controls and are relatively
inexpensive, low maintenance and low infringement in your
environment.
1 A list of attachments that should not normally
traverse e-mail can be found in TruSecure's Antivirus Policy Guide
(www.trusecure.com/html/tspub/whitepaper_index.shtml
)
2 See www.infosecuritymag.com/2002/feb/columns_executive.shtml
for an explanation of how multiple synergistic controls reduce
risk.
Synergistic AV Controls
When used in conjunction with primary AV controls, these and
other similar controls can help organizations achieve "synergistic
security" against evolving malcode threats. Use this list to develop
your own inexpensive, low-impact, low-maintenance strategy to create
real defense-in-depth in your organization.
Control Internet Mail
- Disallow noncorporate e-mail by policy.
- Block common Internet mail sites like Yahoo! and Hotmail (get
proxy log first).
- Block attachments and/or control content for Internet
mail.
Web Proxy Server Content Control
- Use a proxy server.
- Filter file attachments at the Web proxy. (This may be
difficult to do on an enterprise scale, since *.exe and *.dll
files may be required for certain functions, such as desktop
patching.)
- Rapidly apply appropriate filters following new virus alerts.
- Use AV scanning at Web proxy.
Mail Gateway Content Filtering
- Rapidly apply appropriate filters following new virus alerts.
- Filter specific lists of old viruses/worms to protect against
new variants and old restarts.
- Filter generic code/scripting items (like classid=) that
should not arrive in normal e-mail.
- Convert .html to .rtf or .txt in messages.
- Remove all scripts in mail: script, jscript, vbscript,
etc.
Human Factors
- Educate users not to double-click on anything unexpected or
unusual.
- Don't double-click on mail with no title or body text.
Outlook Configurations
- Configure Outlook to use AutoPreview, not Preview Pane.
- Apply Outlook security patch.
- Use Outlook 2002.
- Configure Outlook to utilize restricted site zones separate
from IE.
- Disable HTML in Outlook 2002.
- Use Russ Cooper's (NTBugtraq) NoHTML utility (www.ntbugtraq.com/nohtml.asp).
- Use junk mail rules to predelete files with attachments of
certain types.
Configure IE
- Use security zones to keep browser from browsing any site not
previously listed in acceptable corporate URL list.
- Set all scripting types in all zones to "Disable" or "Prompt"
(including the hidden "Local Computer Zone").
- Patch all security-critical vulnerabilities.
Configure Netscape
- Disable JavaScript for e-mail and news.
Application Choices
- Use e-mail clients other than Outlook.
- Use Web browsers other than IE.
Desktop OS Configurations
- Disable Windows Scripting Host (WSH).
- Change default file associations:
-Configure Notepad to
open potentially infected files (e.g., *.vbs).
-Disable
Outlook Express (overwrite it with Notepad.exe, but keep original
name).
- Use highly permissioned file systems for application and
configuration files.
- Rename Notepad.exe to Mediaplayer.exe as a way to delete Media
Player.
Use Third-Party Security Software
- Use a desktop firewall on all remote desktops/laptops.
- Use content management software on desktops.
- Use content management software on mail and proxy
servers.
Patch, Patch, Patch
- Aggressively patch IE and Outlook.
- Apply critical desktop OS patches.
Office Application Configuration
- Turn on all macro virus protections in Word and Excel.
- Use latest Office applications.
- Use .rtf instead of .doc as default file format in
Word.
Architecture Synergistics
- Go to thin client, even for browsing.
- Ensure host mail client, application clients and Office
clients are highly controlled, well patched and
maintained.
Antivirus Synergistics
- Use heuristics available in AV software.
- Set to read-only: OS files, configuration files.
- Set AV product to alert on DoS; block read-only attribute
change.
Firewall Synergistics
- Control outbound traffic and protocols as aggressively as
inbound.
- Use default-deny mode.
Intranetworking Synergistics
- Use high segmentation protocol filtering (e.g., with routers).
- Use antispoofing, both egress and ingress filtering at border
and intranet routers.
- Configure routers (especially border routers) to default
deny.
Recovery Synergistics
- Use standard builds. Use hash/checksum databases of
drives (e.g., Tripwire).
- Use available multivendor AV releases for infections
(independent of the specific AV used for protection).
- Create and maintain ghost images of drives.
PETER TIPPETT, M.D., Ph.D. (ptippett@infosecuritymag.com),
is the executive publisher of Information Security and CTO of
TruSecure Corp.